The sharp increase in volatility of capital flows in recent years has resulted in many countries altering the regulations governing the flow of foreign capital only to find such changes having a limited impact. We postulate that one reason for the limited effectiveness of such changes in regulations is the level of financial sector development in the country. As a country enhances its level of financial sector development, it also develops more and more sophisticated financial instruments. The more advanced the domestic financial instruments are, and the deeper is the integration of the domestic financial markets with the world markets, the greater is the likelihood of developing strategies to bypass capital account management measures. In this paper, we use various empirical techniques to identify the impact of financial sector development on capital flows, after accounting for regulatory regime. The empirical results indicate that there is a threshold effect in the financial sector development capital flow relationship. In particular, financial sector development augments greater integration with global capital flows only above a threshold level. Below the threshold level we find financial development reduces the extent of integration with global capital markets.
Introduction
During the last two and a half decades, emerging markets have been subject to the substantial vagaries of capital flows. Gross capital inflows (as a % of GDP) to emerging markets more than doubled from being around 2.8% of GDP in the first quarter of 1990 to around 7.0% in the last quarter of 1996 ( Figure 1 ). 1 However, they collapsed to 1.3% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 1997, as several countries in East and South East Asia entered into a crisis. After remaining subdued for the next few years, inflows started picking up from early 2000s, reaching a peak of 12.5% of GDP in the second quarter of 2007. The onset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Chinn and Ito (2006) . the sub-prime crisis in 2007, and the subsequent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, resulted in a strong reversal of flows to emerging markets, resulting in gross capital outflows to the extent of 4.9% of GDP. Subsequently, the pursuit of unconventional monetary policy in the advanced economies in the form of low interest rates, to boost aggregate demand, resulted in a large quantum of capital flowing into the emerging markets.
Such heightened volatility in capital flows has significantly enhanced the complexities involved in balancing the diverse objectives of managing the macroeconomy, and has rekindled the debate on imposing various macroeconomic and capital account management measures to manage these capital flows. These measures have been aimed at resisting excessive currency appreciation that would make domestic exports uncompetitive, prevent creation of asset bubbles, bursting of which can entail a significant cost, retain monetary policy autonomy, which is essential to maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce vulnerability from contagion effects (Magud & Reinhart, 2006) . In the post-GFC period, as the unconventional monetary policies in the advanced economies resulted in a surge of capital flows into emerging markets, several countries such as Brazil, Peru, Korea and Indonesia imposed capital flow management measures such as tax on inflows, additional capital requirements for foreign exchange credit exposure, minimum holding period and withholding tax to manage the volatility of these flows. These changes in regulations were reflected in a drop in de jure capital account openness in many countries. In contrast, this had a limited impact on de facto openness, as generally measured by cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities.
In this paper we postulate that one reason for changes in regulations, reflected in change in de jure openness, having negligible impact on de facto openness, is the level of financial sector development in a country. In particular, we empirically test the hypothesis that increased financial sector development leads to a higher degree of de facto openness, even after controlling for de jure capital account openness. As a country enhances its level of financial sector development, it develops more and more sophisticated financial instruments. The more advanced the domestic financial instruments are, and the deeper is the integration of the domestic financial markets with the world markets, the greater is the likelihood of developing strategies to bypass capital flow management measures. Moreover, strategies to evade these measures tend to develop rapidly, especially in the case of selective measures targeting specific kinds of flows. Uniform restrictions tend to be easier to enforce, but they are obviously incapable of altering the composition of flows, which is the key issue from macro-prudential perspective.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature. In Section 3, we analyze the evolution of de facto openness and various determinants found in the literature influencing de facto openness. In Section 4, we examine the link between de facto openness and financial sector development using a variety of econometric techniques. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the main findings of the paper.
Literature Review
With global capital flows being inherently volatile, many countries have sought to implement measures aimed at managing cross-border flow (Bluedorn et al., 2013) . These measures have ranged from allowing the exchange rate to move freely, asserting monetary autonomy to respond to needs of the macroeconomy, managing the flow of hot money to avoid the formation of asset bubbles and stemming the risks of contagion in the event of a financial crisis occurring in other economies (Coelho & Gallagher, 2010; Magud & Reinhart, 2006) . Consequently, many of the financially open economies have employed capital flow management measures at different points in time and to varying degrees. 2 Cross-border capital flows are influenced by numerous factors. In the literature, these factors are classified into two categories, push factors or global factors that are extraneous to the host countries and pull factors, which tend to be country specific (Fratzscher, 2012; Volz, 2012) . 3 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, both these factors have been found to be major determinants of cross-border flows. For instance, the large volumes of capital flows from United States to Latin American and Asian economies were found to be equally sensitive to push and pull factors thus giving them equal significance (Taylor & Sarno, 1997) . However, with global capital flows surging to economies with very diverse characteristics in the first half of 2000s it was realized that global factors like cyclical movements in interest rates and risk appetite seem crucial in driving these flows (Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Milesi-Ferretti & Tille, 2011; Volz, 2012) . In a recent paper Pagliari and Hannan (2017) , conduct an empirical exercise, and conclude that push factors tend to be more important compared to pull factors when explaining volatility of capital flows.
The predominance of global factors in recent years have undermined the role played by domestic factors, and has resulted in volume of cross-border capital flowing into a country being discordant with the absorptive capacity of that country. This resulted in numerous macroeconomic tensions in the economy, and forced economies to introduce various capital account management measures. However, the efficacy of these measures has been mixed at best. Baba and Kokenyne (2011) conclude that price-based capital flow management measures were not significantly effective in discouraging capital inflows or altering their composition in selected Asian and Latin American countries. Hutchison (2012) undertakes a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence on the efficacy of capital controls focusing on the impact of the controls on exchange rate volatility, disruptive effects of volatile short-term and speculative capital flows and loss of monetary autonomy. The paper concludes that there is limited evidence of these measures having an impact on warding off currency crisis or sudden stops, although there is some evidence of these measures slowing aggregate flows in the desired direction and shifting the composition of capital flows towards longer maturity. Capital flow management measures were found to be most successful in providing some autonomy to the monetary authorities. However, most of impact was temporary, and withered away over a period. Studies like Basu, Eichengreen, and Gupta (2015) and Sengupta and Sen Gupta (2016) have shown that imposition of ad hoc capital flow management measures tend to have negligible impact on cross-border capital flow in various Asian economies. Ariyoshi et al. (2000) point out that a key factor that limits the effectiveness of the capital flow management measures is the presence of developed financial sector, which reduces the cost of circumvention relative to the incentives. Garber (1998) highlight the use of offshore derivatives trading to dodge these measures. Focusing on Brazil, de Carvalho and Garcia (2008) highlight numerous examples where sophisticated financial markets helped investors circumvent the capital flow management measures. These have ranged from financial instruments being used to disguise short-term investments as long-term, equity, or trade-finance to use of derivatives.
Consequently, while a large volume of the existing research, including Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine (2005) and Demetriades and Andrianova (2005) have found that a deep and well-functioning financial system is a key element behind economic growth, it can have unintended consequences like limiting the effectiveness of capital flow management measures. 4 A large volume of literature has focused on the reverse channel of causation, i.e. increased de facto openness has fostered greater financial sector development through different ways. Liberalization of the capital account would help interest rates achieve their competitive equilibrium by easing financial repression (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) . This would significantly improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Chinn and Ito (2006) point out that dismantling of capital controls widens the availability of funds for borrowers while allowing domestic and foreign investors to engage in improved portfolio diversification. Finally, the resultant rise in competition because of capital account liberalization would also weed out the existing inefficient financial systems and thereby increase the overall efficiency level of the financial system (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001; Stiglitz, 2000) . Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2009) also argue that both trade and financial openness, as well as quality of economic institutions, explain a large part of the variation in financial sector development across countries.
Evolution of Key Variables Impacting Capital Flows
Over the last two and a half decades, most countries have significantly liberalized crossborder movement of capital. Cross-border holding of financial assets and liabilities, a measure of de facto openness, developed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) , rose sharply from being equal to world GDP in early 1990s, to a peak of over 300% of world GDP in 2007 (Figure 1 ). Immediately, after GFC, there was a drop in de facto openness due to rise in risk averseness among global investors and diminished cross-border activity by banks in the advanced economies. The unconventional monetary policies introduced in various advanced economies to aid their recovery led to a rise in cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities from 2009 onwards, especially in the advanced economies. However, the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, and tapering of its bond buying program by the Federal Reserve Bank in United States in 2013, have resulted in the extent of de facto openness remaining stagnant over the last few years.
One of the factors driving the increase in cross-border holding of assets and liabilities during the 1990s and 2000s could be the progressive liberalization of the guidelines governing the ownership of these assets and liabilities. Figure 1 highlights the evolution of a de jure capital account liberalization index, which is based on the legal restrictions imposed on cross-border financial transactions. 5 The index is developed in Chinn and Ito (2006) with a higher number indicating greater openness. However, as is evident, the increase in de jure openness is relatively muted compared to evolution of de facto openness. Thus there are factors, other than liberalization of capital flow management measures, that have contributed to rise in volume of cross-border transactions.
One such factor is the stance of monetary policy followed in the advanced economies. For a substantial period since the early 2000s, advanced economies have pursued a lax monetary policy, allowing the balance sheets of the central banks in these economies to expand substantially (Figure 2 ). The pace of accumulation of central bank assets (as a % of GDP) in advanced economies started increasing since the mid-1990s and continued till 2006. The signals of onset of the sub-prime crisis, and the subsequent onset of the GFC led to a temporary decline in the accumulation of assets by the central bank. In the aftermath of GFC, central banks of the advanced economies implemented unconventional monetary policies to restore financial market stability and bolster economic activity. Apart from sharply reducing policy rates, these policy measures included a large volume of asset purchases to reduce long-term yield and rekindle aggregate demand. Sahay et al. (2014) point out that Quantitative Easing (QE) by the United States led to a 750% increase in the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve Bank.
Rising trade openness has often been cited as influencing capital flows through a variety of channels. Antras and Caballero (2009) argue that in less financially developed countries trade integration increases the incentives for capital to flow into these economies. In such economies there exist numerous financial constraints that misallocate capital across sectors. Trade alleviates this misallocation problem, thereby incentivizing capital to flow into these countries. Taylor and Wilson (2006) also establish a positive effect of trade on financial flows, arguing that trade decreases asymmetric information and hence enhances capital flows. Furthermore, with increasing openness to international trade, it becomes difficult to maintain restrictions on capital flows as greater trade openness provides numerous opportunities for evading these capital flow restrictions by misinvoicing the trade transactions (Patnaik, Sen Gupta, & Shah, 2012) . Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that unless trade and capital account openness proceed in a collaborative manner there are increased chances of economic distortions. For example, opening up to trade, without a commensurate level of capital account openness can lead to financial repression as the domestic industry would demand finance at cheaper rates to challenge foreign competition. Similarly, liberalizing flow of foreign capital alone can result in domestic large firms, by getting selective access to foreign funds, to be at an advantage compared to its competitors. The last two and a half decades have witnessed trade openness, measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to a country's GDP, increasing across various countries ( Figure 3 ). This ratio rose to its peak levels by 2006 before the sub-prime crisis and the subsequent GFC led to a sharp drop in the ratio during 2007-2009. The ratios have recovered a bit thereafter but continues to be well below its peak level.
The quality of institutions in an economy is also an important factor in driving capital flows. Investors often base their decisions on the quality of institutions in the host country, apart from the economic pull factors. The standard neoclassical theory predicts that capital will flow to countries with a higher expected net value of investment. However, this expected value can be affected by institutional quality as the latter takes into account property rights and credibility of government policy. An improvement in institutional quality should attract greater capital inflows as investors look for safer investments (flight to quality). At the same time, better institutions would also result in domestic agents allocating more capital in the residence country instead of taking it abroad. The quality of institution is assessed using the set of institutional variables available from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), estimated by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) . The indicators encompass (i) likelihood of an unconstitutional change in government with or without violence, (ii) credibility of policies and its independence from political pressures, (iii) government's ability to implement policies to boost private sector development, (iv) extent to which citizen's are able to participate in selecting their government and their freedom of expression, (v) extent to which public power is exercised for private gain and (vi) extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules society, especially those related to contract enforcement, property rights, police and the courts. These indexes have been normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation.
The evolution of these indicators are outlined in Figure 4 . It is evident that across the different indicators, institutional quality in advanced economies is better than emerging markets. Since these indicators are highly correlated, (R 2 ≥ 0.7), we create an institutional quality index by extracting a component of the six governance indicators, using the principal component analysis ( Figure 5 ). This index also reduces the measurement error and sorts out multicollinearity issues.
Although, across all the indicators, there is limited variation for a country group over the period 1996-2015, there is considerable variation within the countries. Figure 5 shows that in 2014, the institutional quality index ranged from −1.81 for Equatorial Guinea to 2.32 for New Zealand. Generally, countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Middle East and South Asia have negative values, while the OECD economies and selected economies of East and South East Asia have positive values.
Furthermore, overall economic growth can also influence the cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities, as a healthy GDP growth is associated with new investment opportunities arising in that economy and thereby attracts both domestic and foreign investors. Finally, in this paper, we argue that a key determinant of cross-border flow of capital is the extent of financial sector development in an economy. During the last two decades, alongside a rising capital account openness, several countries have experienced an unprecedented progress in the development of the financial sector ( Figure 6 ). Moreover, this increase in the level of financial sector development is robust to different indicators of financial sector development. As can be seen in Appendix Table A1 , barring the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, all the other measures of financial sector development are highly correlated with each other (R 2 ≥ 0.65). These trends towards deregulation and privatization in financial sector can influence the behavior of domestic and foreign investors, and thereby on the volume and composition of capital inflows and outflows. Foreign investors tend to be hampered by the lack of knowledge of domestic conditions while investing in a distant location. They are neither aware of the risks nor the opportunities of the local markets as well as local investors. Financial intermediaries, by extending their knowledge about local market risks to foreign investors are able to provide credibility to potential profit thereby stimulating their entry. A well developed financial sector also promotes cross-border capital flows by facilitating interactions between foreign firms and local firms. Similarly, portfolio flows are contingent on certain level of financial sector development such as a well developed equity and bond markets. Furthermore, a well developed financial sector is able to generate instruments through financial engineering that can circumvent existing capital flow management measures.
The relationship between de jure capital account openness and de facto openness across countries with different levels of financial sector development is highlighted in Figure 2 . 6 It is evident that in countries with low levels of financial sector development there is no relationship between de jure and de facto openness. However, for economies with high levels of financial sector development, there exists a significantly positive relationship between de jure and de facto openness. Moreover, Figure 2 also shows that for a given level of de jure capital account openness, countries with high level of financial sector development exhibit higher degree of de facto openness compared to countries where the financial sector is less financially developed. For example the average de jure openness in countries with high levels of financial sector development at 0.68 is not substantially different from that in countries with low levels of financial sector development, where de jure openness averages 0.58. However, the average level of de facto openness at 2.3 in the former is nearly double of 1.2 witnessed in the latter.
Thus our main testable hypothesis is that for similar degrees of de jure openness, countries with higher financial sector development experience greater cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities. We focus on the period 1990-2014 across advanced and emerging markets.
Empirical Strategy

Data Sources
As discussed above, de facto capital account openness is measured by the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, and the data is sourced from External Wealth of Nations dataset built in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) . The authors estimate external assets and liabilities for 211 industrial and developing countries using the international investment position figures published by national central banks, governments and multilateral agencies over the period 1970-2015. The dataset covers total foreign assets and liabilities as well as breaks down these to FDI, debt, and portfolio assets and liabilities.
For de jure capital account openness, we use the index developed in Chinn and Ito (2006) . The index is based on information regarding restrictions in the International Monetary Fund's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Specifically, the index is the first standardized principal component of the variables that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, on capital account transactions, and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The dataset covers 182 countries over the period 1970-2014. Financial sector development can be captured in a variety of ways. One can focus on the banking sector as well as the stock or bond market. However, availability of cross-country data on development of the stock market, bond market or the mutual fund is limited, as can be seen in Table A1 . Hence we focus on the banking system, and focus on the ratio of credit provided by the banking system to the private sector to GDP as our main indicator of financial sector development. To check the robustness of our results, we also use alternate indicators of financial sector development including the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP. The data is sourced from Financial Development and Structure developed in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2010) and updated in Cihak et al. (2012) . The dataset covers 203 countries over the period 1960-2014. To capture the impact of unconventional monetary policies we consider the interest rate differential between an individual country and the risk free rate. Given the extremely low probability of default by the United States on its treasury securities we consider the interest rate on these securities as the nominal risk free rate. However, global investors would be not only focus on nominal returns but would be concerned about the real return, which would be influenced by exchange rate movements, which in turn would be impacted by relative price differentials. Hence we focus on real interest rates by considering the real risk free interest rate for the individual countries, and taking the difference with the US risk free rate to obtain the real interest rate differential. The data is sourced from World Development Indicators.
Data on institutional variables is sourced from WGI of World Bank, and is based on 
Estimation Strategy
Static Panel Analysis
Our baseline empirical model is given by the following equation
where i refers to country and t represents the time periods. Here Y is the dependent variable, i.e. the extent of de facto openness. While X refers to the main variable of interest, i.e. the extent of financial sector development, Z refers to the key control variable, i.e. de jure openness. Finally, is a vector of other variables described above that influence de facto openness. We estimate Equation (1) using the feasible generalized least square estimation (FGLS) methodology, and the results are reported in Table 1 . Under FGLS, the estimation strategy assumes the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation, and that the coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel. Furthermore the error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic. At the aggregate level we find there is no relationship between de jure openness and de facto openness. This is in line with Figure 2 which shows de jure openness is not a good indicator of de facto openness in countries, which have low levels of financial sector development.
In contrast, a rise in financial sector development, measured by the credit the financial sector provides to the private sector (% of GDP), is associated with an increase in cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities (as a percentage of GDP). De facto openness increases by 1.48 to 1.64 percentage points of GDP as financial sector development improves by one percentage point. As countries improve the level of financial sector development, financial institutions are able to promote greater integration with global capital markets by providing information to foreign investors to incentivize their entry, facilitating interactions between foreign firms and local firms, developing markets such as equities and bond markets, and creating instruments through financial engineering that can circumvent existing capital flow management measures.
Across most of the specifications in Table 1 , interest rate differential does not have any significant impact on de facto openness. Only in specification 5 we find a positive and significant relationship between interest rate differential and de facto openness. In contrast, GDP growth rates shows up as a significant and negative determinant of de facto openness. This may seem counterintuitive as it implies that countries, which are growing at a rapid rate, and presumably generating more investment opportunities are witnessing lower volume of cross-border capital flow. However, the outcome can be explained by the fact that it is typically the emerging markets that are witnessing rapid growth, and these economies continue to experience lower volume of capital flows, compared to the advanced economies which account for bulk of the cross-border transactions, but are growing at a much lower rate.
Table 1 also indicates that increased trade openness is associated with greater capital flows, underlying the fact that trade openness alleviates the constraint of resource misallocation and asymmetric information, thereby incentivizing capital flows. Similarly, the institutional quality index also positively influences capital flows as investors are more confident of investing in countries, which boasts of better institutions. When we use individual metrics of institutional quality, we find control of corruption, regulatory quality and government effectiveness have a significant impact on capital flows.
However, there exists great deal of divergence among countries at various stages of development. To understand this we undertake a subsample analysis where we look at how the above set of factors impact cross-border acquisition of assets at different income levels. To do this we focus on countries across different income groups as per World Bank's classification. These include high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income and low-income economies. The results are reported in Tables A2-A5 . We find important difference across the different income groups. First, de jure openness shows up as an important determinant of capital flows for the high income group, and not the other three. This could be driven by the fact that among the high-income countries the enforcement of laws guiding the openness of capital account is expected to be robust, and therefore de facto and de jure openness would show some degree of co-movement. In the other income groups, a lack of enforcement would create a divergence between de facto and de jure openness in some countries, while in others due to variety of reasons foreign investors may be reluctant to invest despite abolition of capital flow management measures.
In three of the four sub-samples viz. high income, upper middle income and lower middle income economies, financial sector development continues to be a positive significant determinant of de facto openness, across almost all specifications. However, in the case of low income economies, the coefficient becomes negative but continues to remain significant. The opposite sign in the low-income countries could be explained by the fact that greater development of financial sector would be associated with some residents opting to invest their money within the country instead of sending it abroad. 7 This leads to a decline in cross-border flow of capital.
The coefficient on interest rate differential is largely insignificant for most specifications across the various income levels. In only a couple of specifications in upper-and lower-middle income countries we find the coefficient being positive and insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient on trade openness is significant and positive for all specifications across all the country groups, reiterating the importance of a country's opening up to trade in facilitating greater movement of capital across borders.
The institutional index also shows up as a significant determinant of capital flows across all income levels, barring the low-income economies. In the low-income countries the coefficient has a negative sign but is insignificant.
Dynamic Panel Analysis
One major limitation of the static model is that it does not account for the fact that financial sector development could potentially be an endogenous regressor. As described in Section 2, a large volume of literature has identified the role of capital account openness in improving the financial sector through numerous channels. Moreover, since our measure of de facto openness is based on acquisition of foreign assets and liabilities, and hence is a stock measure, it is likely to be highly persistent. In such instances, it could result in dynamic panel bias and cause biased estimates. To address both these issues, i.e. endogeneity and dynamic panel bias, we resort to generalized method of moments, i.e. Difference-GMM articulated in Arellano and Bond (1991) . Under the Differnce-GMM, the model is first differenced to remove the state-specific effects, and the endogenous variables with their lagged levels being used as instruments. Thus Equation (1) transforms to Table 2 reports the results of Difference-GMM estimation. We focus on specification (5) of Table 1 , taking into account the lagged dependent variable (Y it−1 ) and endogeneity of financial sector development. We report the results for the entire sample as well as the country groups split according to the income levels.
As expected the lagged dependent variable is large and significant in the case of full sample as well as the various sub-samples. Furthermore, the results indicate that even after taking into account the persistence in de facto openness and endogeneity of financial sector development, the hypothesis that greater development of the financial sector leads to greater acquisition of cross-border assets and liabilities largely holds. As before de jure capital account openness is a significant predictor of de facto openness only in the case of high income countries. Lack of enforcement of capital flow management measures and limited interest amongst investors in investing in some countries create a dichotomy between de facto openness and de jure openness among the countries of the other income groups. Source: Authors' estimates. Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%.
Among the other explanatory variables, both GDP growth rate and interest rate differential continue to be a significant predictor of de facto capital account openness in countries belonging to either lower middle income or low income group. This continues to be in line with the results obtained in Table 1 . Improvement in institutional quality continue to have a positive and significant impact on de facto capital account openness in upper and lower income countries. In contrast, in low-income economies, an improvement in institutional quality is associated with lower de facto openness, although the effect is not significant. A large part of the cross-border movement in capital in these economies takes the form of capital flight (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2003; Ngeno, 2000) due to fear of expropriation rising out of political instability and unsound economic policies. An improvement in institutional quality can help allay these concerns, and incentivize the residents in these economies to invest in domestic assets thereby reducing cross-border flow of capital. Finally, trade openness ceases to be a significant predictor of de facto openness in this specification.
A key problem with the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that if the autoregressive parameter of the endogenous variable is sufficiently large, and there are a limited number of time-series observations, the Difference-GMM estimator will have a low precision and downward bias. To overcome this, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) articulate the System-GMM, which improves the precision and reduces the bias. Under a System-GMM, two simultaneous equations are estimated. In the first one original equation in levels is used with lagged first difference as instruments, while in the second one first-differenced equation is used with lagged levels as instruments.
Although the results of the System-GMM in Table 3 are broadly similar to the Difference-GMM outlined in Table 2 , there are some important differences. De facto capital account openness continues to show strong persistence, with the lagged value showing up as a significant predictor across all the specifications. Institutional quality also continues to be an important predictor in upper-and lower-middle income countries, while GDP growth is negatively related to de facto openness in lower-middle and low-income countries. Middle-and low-income countries continue to find that following a monetary policy that results in higher real interest rates relative to the United States helps them to attract more capital flows. Trade openness continues to remain an insignificant variable.
An important difference, between System-GMM and Difference-GMM estimation results relate to the size of the coefficient on the financial sector development variable. Across the full sample, as well as sub-samples of high, upper-middle and lower-middle income economies, the impact financial sector development on de facto capital account openness is significantly higher under the System-GMM specification compared to the Difference-GMM. Thus accounting for the persistence in key variables results in the impact of financial sector development on de facto openness to be considerably large. Moreover, across both Difference-GMM and System-GMM, the impact of financial sector development on de facto openness is highest in the high-income economies, followed by upper-middle and lower-middle income countries. Consequently, our results indicate that as countries move up across the income spectrum, the impact of financial sector development on capital account openness increases steadily.
Threshold Panel Analysis
A key finding from the sub-sample analysis above is that across various empirical specifications, the relationship between financial sector development and de facto openness is not linear. In low-income countries, which are also countries with lower level of financial sector development, an improvement in the level of financial sector development is associated with either a drop in the level of de facto openness or an insignificant impact. On the other hand, for lower-middle, upper-middle and high income countries, which are characterized by better developed financial sector, there is a significant positive impact of financial sector development on de facto openness. Thus there is a threshold effect on the relationship between financial sector development and de facto openness. Only above a certain threshold level of economic development the level of financial sector development is beneficial for de facto openness. In this section we formally test this hypothesis employing threshold regression.
Threshold regression has been widely used to study economic relationships between key macroeconomic variables including financial sector development and growth, inflation and growth etc. However, according to our knowledge, ours is the first paper that is using this empirical tool to analyze the relationship between financial sector development and de facto openness. We use the dynamic panel threshold model developed by Kremer, Bick, and Nautz (2013) , which extends the original static setup model introduced in Hansen (1999) to endogenous regressors. We consider the following threshold model of financial sector development and de facto openness.
While Y it and X it continue to be the de facto openness and financial sector development, it denotes the partly endogenous control variables. However, now X it is both the threshold variable, and the regime dependent regressor. Following Bick (2010), we allow for differences in the regime intercepts (δ i ). Within it income is considered as the endogenous variable, while the remaining are the control variables described above. Given the need for a strongly balanced panel data for panel dynamic threshold regression model and the requirement of a large number of cross-section units with a small number of time periods, we average the data set over four year periods, i.e. 1996-1999, 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011 and 2012-2015 . This gives usfive observations for each country with a total of 610 observations. The results of the panel dynamic threshold regression model are presented in Table 4 . The estimated financial sector development threshold of 0.243 reflects credit to private sector from banking and non-banking sources being 24.3% of GDP. There are 236 observations below the threshold, with a majority of these being in the first two periods, i.e. 1996-1999 and 2000-2003 . The regime dependent coefficients of financial sector development, i.e.β 1 andβ 2 have the expected signs and are significant. Financial sector development is negatively correlated with de facto openness (β 1 = −0.367) when financial sector development is below the threshold, while the opposite is true at higher levels of financial sector development (β 2 = 0.689).
Given the high correlation between the level of financial sector development and GNI per capita, the fitted line shows that the threshold level of financial sector development (0.243) corresponds to GNI per capita of around 900 (current US$, Atlas method). This corresponds to almost the middle of the range of the cap for classifying low income countries, which increased from 785 in 1997 to 1045 in 2014 (Fantom & Serajuddin, 2016) , and is thus consistent with our results obtained in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
Thus, the threshold regression analysis shows that there is a non-monotonic relationship between financial sector development and de facto openness. At very low levels of financial sector development, an improvement in financial sector development reduces de facto openness as domestic investors are incentivized to reduce outward investment, and invest within the domestic economy. After financial sector development crosses the threshold, a further increase in financial sector development leads to an increase in de facto openness, reflecting increased cross-border acquisition of foreign assets and liabilities.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the relationship between financial sector development, proxied by credit provided to the private sector from banking and non-banking sources (% of GDP), and cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities or de facto openness. To that aim we built an empirical model analyzing this relationship, controlling for numerous factors found in the literature to influence the cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities. These include, regulations governing the acquisition of these assets and liabilities, interest rate differential, economic growth, quality of institutions and extent of trade.
Initial static panel data analysis shows that financial sector development has a strong positive and significant influence on de facto openness. A sub-sample analysis based on GNI per capita highlights that the positive influence is largely driven by high, upper-middle and lower-middle income economies, with the nature of relationship reversing in the case of low income economies. Across the various specifications, we find regulations governing thecross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities have a significant impact on these cross-border operations only in the high income countries.
The robustness of these results are verified by incorporating the dynamic panel specification where we account for presence of persistence in cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities, and that de facto openness influences development of the financial sector through numerous channels, and is hence an endogenous regressor. We find our results to be robust with financial sector development continuing to be a significant predictor of de facto openness in high, upper-middle and lower-middle income countries, In the case of low income economies, while both System-GMM and Difference-GMM estimations indicate a negative relationship, the relationship is significant only in the case of System-GMM estimation.
A major contribution of the paper is the adoption of the dynamic panel model to capture the threshold level of financial sector development, where the relationship between financial sector development and de facto openness switches from being negative to positive. The empirical results indicate that the financial sector development threshold level corresponds to the middle of the range of the cap for classifying low income countries over the period we cover, thereby validating our finding that the relationship is generally negative in low income countries, but becomes positive as financial sector development and income level increases.
Our analysis indicates that once countries have crossed a threshold level of financial sector development, any further increase in financial sector development results in enhanced linkage with global capital markets by allowing greater cross-border acquisition of assets and liabilities through a variety of channels. These include reducing information asymmetry for foreign investors, facilitating interactions between foreign firms and local firms and developing instruments through financial engineering that can circumvent existing capital flow management measures. Consequently, more finance is not necessarily always better as it can result in domestic economy becoming integrated with global capital markets to an extent that is detrimental to macroeconomic stability. By getting channeled towards easily collateralized, non-tradable investments like real estate, foreign capital can engender asset price booms and bust, which are costly for the real economy. Volatile foreign capital flows can also cause sharp valuation swings in the equity market and abrupt movements in the real exchange rate, both of which can have strong implications for the real sector (Prasad, Rajan, & Subramanian, 2007a; Subramanian, Ostry, & Johnson, 2007) .
Consequently, it is very important for the policymakers to know the optimal level of financial sector development. Instead of solely focusing on increasing the extent of financial sector development, the policymakers should strive to strengthen the quality of intermediation. The financial sector has limited standing of its own, and derives its strength and resilience from the real economy. Thus the real sector should be the driver of the financial sector, not the other way round. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Appendix. List of Figures
Appendix. List of Tables
